Tsinghua Science and Technology
Volume 23

Issue 4

Article 7

2018

Achieving Differential Privacy of Genomic Data Releasing via
Belief Propagation
Zaobo He
the Department of Computer Science, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA.

Yingshu Li
the Department of Computer Science, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA.

Ji Li
the Department of Computer Science, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA.

Kaiyang Li
the School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of
China, Chengdu 611731, China.

Qing Cai
the School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of
China, Chengdu 611731, China.

See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: https://tsinghuauniversitypress.researchcommons.org/tsinghuascience-and-technology
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Zaobo He, Yingshu Li, Ji Li et al. Achieving Differential Privacy of Genomic Data Releasing via Belief
Propagation. Tsinghua Science and Technology 2018, 23(4): 389-395.

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by Tsinghua University Press: Journals Publishing.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tsinghua Science and Technology by an authorized editor of Tsinghua
University Press: Journals Publishing.

Achieving Differential Privacy of Genomic Data Releasing via Belief Propagation
Authors
Zaobo He, Yingshu Li, Ji Li, Kaiyang Li, Qing Cai, and Yi Liang

This research article is available in Tsinghua Science and Technology:
https://tsinghuauniversitypress.researchcommons.org/tsinghua-science-and-technology/vol23/iss4/7

ISSN 1007-0214 03/13 pp 389–395
DOI: 10.26599 / TST.2018.9010037
Volume 23, Number 4, August 2018

Achieving Differential Privacy of Genomic Data Releasing via
Belief Propagation
Zaobo He, Yingshu Li∗ , Ji Li, Kaiyang Li, Qing Cai, and Yi Liang
Abstract: Privacy preserving data releasing is an important problem for reconciling data openness with individual
privacy. The state-of-the-art approach for privacy preserving data release is differential privacy, which offers
powerful privacy guarantee without confining assumptions about the background knowledge about attackers. For
genomic data with huge-dimensional attributes, however, current approaches based on differential privacy are not
effective to handle. Specifically, amount of noise is required to be injected to genomic data with tens of million of
SNPs (Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms), which would significantly degrade the utility of released data. To address
this problem, this paper proposes a differential privacy guaranteed genomic data releasing method. Through
executing belief propagation on factor graph, our method can factorize the distribution of sensitive genomic data into
a set of local distributions. After injecting differential-privacy noise to these local distributions, synthetic sensitive
data can be obtained by sampling on noise distribution. Synthetic sensitive data and factor graph can be further
used to construct approximate distribution of non-sensitive data. Finally, non-sensitive genomic data is sampled
from the approximate distribution to construct a synthetic genomic dataset.
Key words: differential privacy; SNP/trait associations; belief propagation; factor graph; data releasing

1 Introduction
With the developing of DNA-genotyping technology, more
and more individuals tend to genotype their DNA, in order
for genetic services. For example, 23andMe[1] , one of
the most popular DNA-sequencing service providers, has
provided such services for more than 900 000 individuals.
With genotyped DNA, individuals can learn about their
predispositions to disease of genetic tendency. Meanwhile,
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massive DNA sequences are significantly beneficial to
researchers to develop new genetic diagnostic methods or
medicines. Furthermore, more and more research groups
release the uncovered associations among genotypes,
haplotypes, or phenotypes (such as GWAS catalog[2] ,
DisGeNET[3] ), which further enrich genetic services and
research works.
However, individual privacy is increasingly threatened
with more and more genomic data being available
online, although significant benefit is brought by them.
Combined with publicly available statistics and kin
genomic information, individual genomes could be
inferred based on machine learning, data mining, or
any statistical analysis techniques. On the one hand,
the uncovered dependency relationship over genomes by
association studies facilitates attackers to launch inference
attacks.
For example, GWAS catalog reported the
trait/SNP (Single Nucleotide Polymorphism) associations,
which could undoubtedly help attackers learn about target
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SNPs or traits of victims depending on publicly available
ones. On the other hand, individual genomes are closely
related with their relatives. There are 99.9% similar in
DNA sequence between two random individuals and the
similar degree is higher between relatives. Therefore,
once an individual’s genomic privacy is breached, all its
relatives are unavoidably placed into risk. Both SNPs and
traits are deeply private, the leak of them may incur serious
discrimination. Therefore, how to realize the tradeoff
between data openness and genomic privacy becomes a
crucial problem.
In this paper, we propose an effective method
to address the problem of releasing differentially
private kin-genomic data.
Implementing differential
privacy in genomic data remains a challenging problem.
Large scale of noise must be injected to highdimensional data in order for satisfying differential
privacy, which definitely degrade data utility.
To
address it, we first explore the possibilities for factorizing
the joint conditional distribution of sensitive genomes
into sets of local probability distributions, by executing
belief propagation on factor graph which captures the
dependency relationship among family members, SNPs,
and traits due to family genetic relationship and SNP/trait
associations. To guarantee differential privacy, noise is
injected to these local probability distributions to construct
approximate distribution for sensitive genomes and then
synthetic sensitive genomes can be sampled. Then,
synthetic sensitive genomes and factor graph are further
used to construct approximate distribution of non-sensitive
genomes. Finally, synthetic nonsensitive genomes can
be sampled and released. Compared with large body
of previous works, which mainly focused on improving
the output of differential privacy mechanism (such as
optimizing specific query results), we study how to
factorize a huge-dimensional distribution into a set of local
distributions, so that scale of noise can be reduced by
injecting into local distributions.

2 Preliminaries
2.1 Belief propagation on factor graph
Belief propagation is an algorithm to perform approximate
inference on probabilistic graph models through passing
messages, including Bayesian networks, factor graph,
and Markov random fields.
It is generally used
to calculate marginal probability distribution for target
unobserved variables, conditional on observed ones. Belief
propagation is generally described by the operations on
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factor graphs (any Bayesian network and Markov random
field can be transformed to factor graph). Factor graph is
one type of undirected graphical models, which contains
two types of nodes: variable node and factor node. There
is an edge between factor node and variable node iff
this variable node is an argument of the factor node. In
belief propagation, each variable node (factor node) sends
message to its neighbor factor nodes (variable nodes).
The propagated message is the probability (belief) of one
variable nodes being a value (such as 1 (0) represents
the presence (absence) of the trait). Given certain initial
states and boundary conditions, belief propagation is to
propagate such message iteratively until the unobserved
variables converge to boundary conditions.
2.2

Differential privacy

For a sensitive dataset D to be released, to guarantee
D satisfies differential privacy, prior to D’s release,
randomized function F is required to add noise to D so
that changing (adding, removing or replacing) an arbitrary
entry in D does not significantly change the output of F .
Differential privacy is formally introduced as follows.
Definition 1 ϵ-Differential privacy. A randomized
function F satisfies ϵ-Differential privacy if for any two
neighbor datasets D and D′ (differing at most one entry),
for any output of F , the following rule is held:
P r[F (D) = O] 6 eϵ P r[F (D′ ) = O].
Informally, differential privacy indicates that from the
output of F , anyone cannot significantly distinguish an
arbitrary entry in D.

3
3.1

Problem Formulation
Genomic data model

Suppose the set of individuals in the target family is
denoted as F . The SNP set of an individual is denoted
as S. The content of SNP j for individual i is denoted
as sij , where sij takes value from: (1) BB (both alleles
inherited from parents are major alleles), (2) Bb (alleles
inherited from parents are major allele and minor allele),
or (3) bb (both alleles inherited from parents are minor
alleles). We assume some individuals in a target family
intend to release their part of SNPs or traits (such as
diseases, hair color, height, etc.) in order for genetic
services or research purpose. However, privacy concerns
drive them to just release part of SNPs or non-sensitive
traits whereas sensitive part is kept private. We denote the
set of non-sensitive variables (including SNPs and traits)
as XK , while sensitive variables as XU .
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For SNP/trait associations reported by GWAS catalog,
the trait set considered are denoted as T . til is defined to
be the value of trait l (l ∈ T ) of individual i, where each til
is specified by a 0/1 value and each of which indicates the
absence/presence of the trait l for individual i.
Mendelian inheritance. From Mendel’s First Law,
each allele of one individual is inherited from his father
or his mother with same probability of 1/2.
Let
F
M
C
F(sj , sj , sj ) denote the Mendelian inheritance for SNP
j, in a family (Father, Mother, and Child). The Mendelian
inheritance for SNP j in a family is introduced in Table 1.
3.2 Problem definition
The studied problem in this paper can be formulated as
follows:
Input:
(1) individual non-sensitive SNPs and traits XK ;
(2) SNP/trait associations reported by GWAS catalog,
A;
(3) Mendelian inheritance for target family
C
F(sFj , sM
j , sj ).
Output:
ϵ-differential privacy preserving genomic data X, X =
XU ∪ XK releasing method.

4 Solution
4.1 Solution overview
This section sketches an overview of our method
for releasing genomic data with ϵ-differential privacy
guarantee. The proposed method runs in five phases:
Phase 1: Calculate the joint conditional distribution of
sensitive variables p(XU |XK , A, F).
Phase 2: Construct ϵ-differential privacy algorithm to
generate the noise version of p(XU |XK , A, F) constructed
in Phase 1. We denote the noise joint conditional
distribution of sensitive variables as p∗ (XU |XK , A, F).
Phase 3: Sample sensitive variables from the noise
joint conditional distribution p∗ (XU |XK , A, F) generated
in Phase 2 to generate synthetic sensitive variables XU ∗ .
Phase 4: Calculate the joint conditional distribution
of non-sensitive variables p(XK |XU ∗ , A, F) based on
Table 1

Probability distribution of Child’s genotype, given

different probability distribution of its parents genotypes.
Mother

Father
BB

Bb

bb

BB

(1, 0, 0)

(1/2, 1/2, 0)

(0, 1, 0)

Bb

(1/2, 1/2, 0)

(1/4, 1/2, 1/4)

(0, 1/2, 1/2)

bb

(0, 1, 0)

(0, 1/2, 1/2)

(0, 0, 1)
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synthetic sensitive variables XU ∗ generated in Phase 3.
Phase 5: Sample non-sensitive variables from the joint
conditional distribution p(XK |XU ∗ , A, F) calculated in
Phase 4 to generate synthetic sensitive variables XK ∗ .
Finally, the target individual releases the synthetic
genomic data X ∗ , X ∗ = XK ∗ ∪ XU ∗ . In short,
our method is to use synthetic SNPs and traits X ∗ of
individuals to approximate the real SNPs and traits X.
Relatively, sampling operations (Phase 3 and Phase 5) are
straightforward. However, calculating the joint conditional
distribution (Phase 1 and Phase 4) and constructing ϵdifferential privacy algorithm in Phase 2 are non-trivial.
In the following subsections, we detail these phases and
prove our method satisfies ϵ-differential privacy.
4.2

Generation of joint conditional distribution

The computation complexity grows exponentially with the
number of variables so that it is infeasible to calculate
joint conditional distribution in both Phase 1 and Phase 4
directly considering human’s genomes generally contain
tens of million of SNPs. Therefore, we expect the
joint conditional distribution can be factorized into the
product of several local functions, and each one captures
the dependency relationship among variables (because of
trait/SNP association A, and Mendelian inheritance F), by
supporting a subset of variables. Through running belief
propagation on factor graph, the computation complexity
can be improved from exponential to linear complexity.
For this, we develop a factor graph to capture the
dependency relationship among variables. A factor graph
uses Variable Node and Factor Node to represent variables
and dependency relationship among them, respectively.
In our factor graph, four types of nodes are considered:
(1) SNP variable node: taking each SNP as a variable
node; (2) trait variable node: taking each trait as a
variable node; (3) familial factor node: representing the
Mendelian inheritance among individuals; (4) trait factor
node: representing the triat/SNP associations.
Then,
• SNP variable node sij and trait variable node til
i
connect to trait factor node gjl
if SNP j is one of the
SNPs associated with trait l.
• Each SNP variable node sij connects to its familial
factor node fji . SNP variable node sij also connects
to fjk if individual k is the father or mother of
individual i.
For example, a factor graph with three trait variable
nodes and four SNP variable nodes is shown in Fig. 1. As
shown in Fig. 1, for traits 1, 2, and 3, the associated SNPs
are {1, 2}, {2, 3}, and {4}, respectively.
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calculated with Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively. The
joint conditional distribution is then equal to the product
of the values calculated previously. Assuming X ′ =
{s11 , s21 , s31 , t21 , s22 , t13 } in Fig. 1, in which {s11 , s21 , s31 } applies
to Case 1, {t21 , s22 } also applies to Case 1; meanwhile, {t13 }
applies to Case 2.
We then can calculate
Fig. 1

A factor graph with 3 traits and 4 SNPs.

p(X ′ |XK , A, F) ∝

To obtain the joint conditional distribution of an
arbitrary set of variables X ′ , there are three cases to be
considered:
• Case 1: X ′ is the set of variables involved in a factor
node, i.e., the entire neighbors of this factor node.
• Case 2: X ′ is only the subset of variables involved
in a factor node.
• Case 3: X ′ is the set of variables involved in more
than one factor node.
For Case 1, running belief propagation on factor graph,
the joint conditional distribution of the set of variables X ′
involved in a factor node q (q can be familial factor node f
and trait factor node g) can be calculated:
p(X ′ ) ∝ q(X ′ )

∏

µx→q (x)

(1)

x∈X ′

where µx→q (x) is the message passing from variable node
x, x ∈ X ′ to q. For example, if X ′ = {s11 , s21 , s31 }
in Fig. 1, X ′ applies to Case 1, since the nodes in X ′
entirely involve with f13 . In this case, we can obtain
p(X ′ ) ∝ f13 (s11 , s21 , s31 )µs11 →f13 (s11 )µs21 →f13 (s21 )µs31 →f13 (s31 ).
Furthermore, if X ′ = {t21 , s22 }, X ′ also applies to Case 1,
2
. In this case,
since the nodes in X ′ entirely involve with g21
′
2
2
2
2
2
2 (t )µs2 →g 2 (s ).
we can obtain p(X ) ∝ g21 (t1 , s2 )µt21 →g21
1
2
2
21
For Case 2, the joint conditional distribution of X ′
is equal to the marginal distribution of X ′ since X ′ only
contains one variable node in this case (because a factor
node just connects two variable nodes). The marginal
distribution of X ′ can be calculated by multiplying all
messages passed to such variable node in X ′ :
p(X ′ ) ∝

∏

λg→x (x)

(2)

p∈ne(x),x∈X ′

where ne(x) is the set of neighbor factor nodes of x, and
λp→x (x) is the message passed from factor node p, p ∈
ne(x) to variable x, x ∈ X ′ . For example, if X ′ = {t13 } in
1
1 →t1 (t ).
Fig. 1, we can obtain p(X ′ ) ∝ λg43
3
3
For Case 3, it is the superset of Case 1 and Case
2, in which the joint conditional distributions of those
variable nodes applying to Case 1 and Case 2 are first

f13 (s11 , s21 , s31 )µs11 →f13 (s11 )µs21 →f13 (s21 )µs31 →f13 (s31 )×
2
2
2
1
2 (t )µs2 →g 2 (s ) × λg 1 →t1 (t )
g21
(t21 , s22 )µt21 →g21
1
2
3
2
21
43
3

4.3

(3)

Generation of noise joint conditional distribution

Given the joint conditional distribution p(XU |XK , A, F),
to construct approximate distribution p∗ (XU |XK , A, F),
we need to inject ϵ-differential privacy noise.
In
∗
contrast, the calculation of p(XK |XU , A, F) based on
XU ∗ in Phase 4, however, does not need any additional
information from the original data. The joint conditional
distribution of XK can be derived from XU ∗ directly.
Without loss of generality, we assume XU applies to
Case 3. For the joint conditional distribution of variables
XU , the numbers of familial factor node fji (sij1 , sij2 , sij3 )
i
and trait factor node gjk
(tik , sij ) are m and n, respectively.
The following shows how to drive p(XU |XK , A, F) in an
ϵ-differential privacy manner.
For the set of familial factor node fji (sij1 , sij2 , sij3 )
presenting in p(XU |XK , A, F), such as f13 (s11 , s21 , s31 ) in
Eq. (3), we need to inject Laplace noise into the set of
6
, in order to guarantee
fji (sij1 , sij2 , sij3 ) with scale of mϵ
that the noise version of sets of fji (sij1 , sij2 , sij3 ) satisfies
( 2ϵ )-differential privacy since set of fji (sij1 , sij2 , sij3 ) has
3
sensitivity m
.
i
For the set of trait factor node gjk
(tik , sij ) presenting in
2
(t21 , s22 ) in Eq. (3), we need
p(XU |XK , A, F), such as g21
i
to inject Laplace noise into the set of gjk
(tik , sij ) with scale
4
of nϵ
, in order to guarantee that the noise version of sets
i
of gjk
(tik , sij ) satisfies ( 2ϵ )-differential privacy since set of
i
gjk
(tik , sij ) has sensitivity n2 .
4.4

Privacy guarantee

According to compensability property[4] , our method
satisfies ϵ-differential privacy. Specifically, noises injected
to all familiar factor nodes and all trait factor nodes are
ϵ/2, respectively.

5

Related Work

Privacy preserving genomic data release has received
much attention in recent years. Caroline et al.[5] proposed
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methods for differential privacy preserving release of
GWAS catalog statistics, including χ2 -statistics, minor
allele frequency, and p-values. Wang et al.[6] proposed a
method sharing data with differential privacy manner by
splitting original genomes in a top-down way, and then
added noise to each block. Simmons and Berger[7] stated
that current methods for identifying high scoring SNPs
with differential privacy guarantee have low accuracy and
high computational complexity, so that they proposed a
new neighbor distance definition for performing private
GWAS. Johnson and Shmatikov[8] proposed privacy
preserving algorithms for supporting exploratory analysis,
including the location of SNPs with strong association with
specific disease, correlations among SNPs.
In addition to differential privacy, Sankararaman
et al.[9] stated how to combat against the statistical
analysis attack (Homer’s attack[10] ), by restricting data
release scale. Existing works have shown that personal
information is threaten by attackers that usually launch
attacks by exploiting data correlations and effective
privacy preserving methods have also been proposed,
such as location, social attributes[11–17] , or mobile wireless
networks[18–23] . Reference [24] releases certain number of
most crucial SNPs. However, their method makes several
unfeasible assumptions, such as taking only χ2 tack into
consideration, fixed individual size, and the attacker knows
the number of SNPs to release as background knowledge.
For example, Johnson and Shmatikor[8] proposed privacy
preserving algorithms in order for calculating the statistical
information about SNPs involving number and location
which significantly imply the association between SNPs
and diseases. Humbert et al.[25] proposed two privacy
metrics, adversary incorrectness, and uncertainty, to
quantify the privacy loss due to inference attacks on
released genomic data.

6 Conclusion
We have proposed a differential-privacy preserving
kin-genomic data releasing method. Based on factor
graph, which has been proven an effective model
to incorporate high-dimensional data and multiple
correlations among them, our method can factorize
the joint conditional distribution of sensitive genomes
into sets of local probability distributions by executing
belief propagation on factor graph which captures the
dependency relationship among family members, SNPs,
and traits due to family genetic relationship and SNP/trait
associations. A key part of our method is that, to ensure
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differential privacy, noise can be directly injected into
low-dimensional local distributions rather than hugedimensional genomic data, which significantly improve
data utility.
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